North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 31
Number 2 Volume 31, Number 2

Article 4

4-1-2009

An Opiate of the Masses: Religious
Gerrymandering of Sacramental Intoxication
Mark A. Levine

Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Levine, Mark A. (2009) "An Opiate of the Masses: Religious Gerrymandering of Sacramental Intoxication," North Carolina Central
Law Review: Vol. 31 : No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol31/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.

Levine: An Opiate of the Masses: Religious Gerrymandering of Sacramental

AN OPIATE OF THE MASSES:
'RELIGIOUS GERRYMANDERING OF
SACRAMENTAL INTOXICATION
MARK A. LEVINE*

INTRODUCTION

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) prohibits
the Federal Government from substantially burdening an individual's
free exercise of religion unless the Government is able to demonstrate
"that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that government interest."1 Such was the argument maintained by the 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal
(UDV),2 in Gonzalez v. 0 Centro EspiritaBeneficente Uniao do Vegetal (Uniao), brought before the Supreme Court of the United States in

November 2005. 3 The pervasive use of illegal drugs within the United
States has forced the government to strike a balance between the necessity of permitting religious freedom and the importance of enforcing the Controlled Substance Act (CSA). 4 One context in which the
interests of an individual's freedom may supercede the interests of the
government lies in cases of sacramental narcotics use. Yet the justification for religious-based drug use may not be so cut-and-dry as to
permit enjoyment of this freedom by all established religions. Some
have argued that "religious gerrymander[ing] '' 5 has made acceptable
the involvement of otherwise impermissible activities for selected
groups, while leaving others wondering why they are unable to obtain
equivalent rights.6
* J.D., Florida State University, College of Law, 2008.
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b) (2005).
2. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal is the Portuguese translation for "The
Spirit Center of the Beneficent Union of the Two Plants."
3. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-863 (2006) (regulating the importation, manufacture, distribution and
use of psychotropic substances, and divides these substances into five schedules based on their
potential for abuse, accepted medical applicability, and general safety).
5. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970).
6. See Lesley R. Frank, Accommodating Religious Drug Use and Society's War on Drugs,
58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1033-40 (1990) (discussing the government's selective drug policies
in relation to religious organizations).
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In Uniao, the Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari in order to
review a preliminary injunction, which barred the Attorney General
from enforcing the CSA as it applied to the UDV; the CSA prevented the religious organization's importation of the Schedule I restricted substance, ayahuasca.7 The basis of the UDV's argument was
that a prohibition would constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of their religion.8 The Government conceded that their actions
amounted to such a burden but argued that the burden did not violate
the RFRA because applying the CSA was the least restrictive means
of advancing the government's compelling interest of "protecting the
health and safety of UDV members[ ], preventing diversion of
[aya]h[u]asca from the church to recreational users, and complying
with the 1971 United Nations Convention of Psychotropic Substances[.]" 9 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Government failed to demonstrate that this burden would be justified under
either the health and safety or risk of diversion grounds and that the
1971 Convention did not apply to ayahuasca.' °
Courts have not consistently applied religious exemptions among
differing faiths, which leads an observer to question the distinction
between one religion's permissible accommodations over another's.
In Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration," the United States

Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims brought by petitioner Carl Olsen, a member of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, who sought a
religious exemption from laws prohibiting the use and possession of
marijuana.' Olsen was distinguishable from the then-unique exemption for Native American ceremonial use of the hallucinogen peyote.13
The facts and arguments in Olsen, however, bear a stronger resemblance to those presented in Uniao than to the justification granted to
the Native American Church. This article seeks to address the discrepancies between Olsen and Uniao, while using the Native American Church exemption and RFRA as foundations from which to draw
precedent. Part I presents the case history of Uniao, as well as UDV's
7. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)(1) (2006) (defining a Schedule I drug as a substance, which (A) has a
high potential for abuse; (B) has no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States; and (C) has a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or substance under medical
supervision).
8. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 426.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 438-39.
11. 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
12. Id. at 1459.
13. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2009) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule
I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native
American Church, and members of the Native American Church so using peyote are exempt
from registration.").
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beliefs and historical background. Part II analyzes the differences between the drugs associated with each religious group, and compares
the Court's rulings to its justification of the Native American peyote
exemption. Part III suggests a test, which could be implemented in
order to aid the Court in determining the legitimacy of a religious
organization's sacramental drug use request. Part IV considers the
disparity between an individual's freedom to believe and freedom to
act, as well as the differences relating to secular practice and religious
belief. Part V presents the issue of religious gerrymandering and the
xenophobia towards non-traditional faiths. Part VI addresses potential concerns created by past judicial decisions.

I.

BACKGROUND

UDV is a Christian sect founded in Brazil in 1961 by Jose Gabriel
da Costa, known to his followers as Mestre Gabriel. 4 About 8,000
people belong to the UDV in Brazil.1 5 In 1993, the UDV officially
established a branch in the United States. 16 Members of the pioneer
group became associated with Jeffrey Bronfman, the plaintiff in Uniao
and representative for the UDV, in 1989.17 Between 1989 and 1992,
Bronfman traveled between Brazil and the United States to learn with
the UDV's Instructive Body.1 8 He learned Portuguese and, in 1994,
became a full Mestre of the organization. 9 Bronfman later returned
to the United States and, in Santa Fe, New Mexico, established his
church which housed around 130 members in 2006.20 At the time of
this case, there also existed congregations, with a total of eighty-one
members, in Seattle, Washington; Norwood, Colorado; Marin County,
California; and Plantation, Florida.2 1
Central to the UDV faith is receiving communion through ayahuasca tea made from the combination of two plants native to Brazil.2 2

In

1999, United

States

Customs and

Border Protection

14. Joint Appendix (Vol. 1) at 50, Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006) (No. 04-1084), 2005 WL 1628869.

15. Id.
16. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d. 1236,

1240 (D.N.M. 2002).
17. Id.
18. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 51.
19. Id. at 51, 53.
20. Id. at 56.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 64. The tea is prepared by combining two plants; the first is Psychotria virdis, and
contains the drug in question, dimethyltryptamine, a hallucinogen found on Schedule I of the
Controlled Substances Act. The second plant is called BanisteripsisCaapi. The name "Uniao do
Vegetal" refers to the combination of these two plants, which are believed to have sprung from
the graves of the religion's revered historical figures. These plants symbolize the spirits of these
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(Customs) seized three drums of ayahuasca plants.2 3 According to the
plaintiff's declaration, twenty to thirty agents arrived at the church
accompanied by several state and local police officers and acted as if
the UDV were under a drug bust by searching for materials used to

produce and distribute narcotics.24 Investigations revealed that there

had been fourteen prior shipments of the plants to Santa Fe; eleven of
these previous shipments, however, had been formally declared and
cleared by customs officials and the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)." The agents threatened the UDV with prosecu-

tion if they were later found in possession of more of the plants, but it
was the UDV who brought suit, seeking an injunction and declaratory
relief for the repossession of the plants.2 6 The UDV alleged that applying the CSA to the UDV's use of ayahuasca violated RFRA.2 7

The Government argued that the health and safety of the UDV
members needed protection and presented expert witnesses to testify

that the drug had adverse and potentially permanent effects on its
users.28 The UDV responded by presenting its own experts who argued that there was little evidence to support the Government's asser-

tions.2 9 Chief Justice Roberts focused on the word "demonstrates" in
RFRA, defining the word as having satisfied "the burdens of going
forward with the evidence and of persuasion."30 Chief Justice Roberts

reasoned that the UDV effectively demonstrated that its sincere exercise of religion had been burdened.3 1 The Court looked to circuit

court precedent in applying a balancing test and stated that "[t]he balance is between actual irreparable harm to [the] plaintiff and potential
harm to the government which' '32does not even rise to the level of preponderance of the evidence[.]
individuals, much like the wafer and wine represent the flesh and blood of Christ in communion
by the Catholic Church. See id. at 64-65.
23. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425 (2006).
24. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 68.
25. Id. at 69.
26. Id. at 17, 30.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 426. See also Alicia B. Pomilio, Ayahuasca: An Experimental Psychosis that Mirrors the Transmethylation Hypothesis of Schizophrenia, 73 J. E'rHNOPHARMACOLOGY
29,29 (1999) (showing that users experienced symptoms similar to schizophrenia); Jordi Riba et
al., Subjective Effects and Tolerability of the South American PsychoactiveBeverage Ayahuasca in
Healthy Volunteers, 154 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 85 (2001) (showing that among six healthy
male volunteers who used the drug, one experienced anxiety disorder); James C. Callaway &
Charles S. Grob, Platelet Serotonin Uptake Sites Increased in Drinkers of Ayahuasca, 116
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY

385 (1994).

29. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 426. See also Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 134-41 (discussing a lack of adequate research by Callaway and Grob).
30. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 428.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 429 (quoting 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389
F.3d 973, 1009 (10th Cir. 2004) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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The Government further attempted to argue that, under the CSA,
the requirements that the substance have a high potential for abuse,
no currently accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted safety under
medical supervision precluded any individual consideration or exceptions absent those explicitly authorized by the Act. 33 The Court rejected this argument as well, fearing that accepting such a
determination would lead to a CSA that would admit no exceptions.34
Rather, the Court stated that RFRA requires the Government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test be satisfied for the individual rather than burdening an entire class.
Finally, the Government referred to Morton v. Mancari,3 6 arguing
that there exists a "unique" relationship between the United States
and the tribes which permits the Native Americans to use peyote and
that the relationship would not necessarily apply to any other religion. 31 Chief Justice Roberts flatly criticized the Government's argument by pointing out that they neither explained what the "unique"
relationship was nor why such a relationship would justify permitting
the use of a drug that, according to its own arguments, creates a risk of
abuse and could prove dangerous to its users. 38 The Court emphasized that granting permission to the Native American Church for the
use of peyote had not undercut the Government's ability to enforce its
bans for secular use. 39 The Court also rejected the Government's
claim that the importation of the substance violated the 1971 Convention because the Government failed to submit evidence addressing the
international consequences of granting such an exemption.4 ° Thus, in
a unanimous decision, the Court concluded that the Government
failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in barring the UDV from
its sacramental use of ayahuasca.4 1

33. Id. at 429-30.
34. Id. at 430.
35. Id. 430-31.
36. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
37. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 433-34.
38. Id. at 434.
[I]f any Schedule I substance is in fact always highly dangerous in any amount no matter
how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of
peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I
substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes use in religious exercise from
the alleged risk of diversion.
Id.
39. Id. at 433.
40. Id. at 438.
41. Id. at 439.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009

5

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 4

182

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

II.

[Vol. 31:177

DIFFERENTIATION AMONG SCHEDULE I SUBSTANCES

Throughout the Court's opinion, there is no mention of Olsen v.
DEA, where the D.C. Circuit refused to grant an exemption for marijuana use by the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church.4 2 Rather than distinguishing Uniao from Olsen, the Court focuses on drawing similarities
between the Native American Church and the UDV, with respect to
policy and the effects of the two drugs.4 3 Questions arise as to

whether the Court deliberately avoided Olsen, and, if argued in today's Court, whether Olsen would have been decided differently.
The three drugs in question-dimethyltryptamine, (the hallucinogenic chemical in ayahuasca)," peyote, and marijuana-all fall into

the same class of Schedule I substances45 but have been treated differently by courts over the years. Marijuana has itself been the subject of
scrutiny for a number of religious freedom cases but, unlike other
drugs, has continually been rejected as an exception for religious purposes." This is likely due to the fact that marijuana use has proven to
be much more pervasive in the United States than any other illegal
substance.4 7 According to a 2007 study by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 41.8% of twelfth graders had used marijuana in
their lifetimes, as opposed to a much smaller percent of peyote and
DMT users.48 In McBride v. Shawnee County,4 9 the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas noted that almost 800,000
times as many pounds of marijuana had been confiscated by the DEA
than peyote between 1980 and 1987.50 If these statistics hold true for
today, there would be a strong argument validating the Government's
interest in preventing diversion of non-adherents to the religion in
question. Yet these statistics refer only to the general pervasiveness of
the drug and not the religion-based justifications subject to the compelling interest test.
42. See generally id. See also Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (rejecting sacramental drug use). The majority opinion in Olsen was written by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
now a Supreme Court Justice, who joined the decision by Chief Justice Roberts in Uniao to
permit similar sacramental drug use.
43. Uniao, 546 U.S. at 433-34.
44. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp.2d. 1236,
1240 n.2 (D. N.M. 2002).

45. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a)(1) (2006).
46. See Olsen, 878 F.2d at 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497 (1st
Cir. 1984); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Spears,
443 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/marijuana.html (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009).
48. Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Monitoring the Future Survey, http://www.drugabuse.gov/
infofacts/marijuana.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2009) (discussing trends of marijuana use by grade
school students over a thirty-three year period).
49. 71 F. Supp.2d 1098 (D. Kan. 1999).
50. Id. at 1101.
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In addition, the court in McBride justified itself by referring to the
special rights granted to Native Americans, which were specifically rejected in Uniao.51 The court pressed these differences further by stating that, under Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,5 2 Native Americans have

special benefits because they are considered domestic-dependant nations.53 This presents the issue of whether the Government is justified
in favoring one particular cultural group over another and, therefore,
empowering the court to use these remedies to redress historic de jure
discrimination. By granting the Native American Church specific enumerated rights as a degree of "affirmative action" through use of a law
written over 150 years ago to remedy past discriminatory conduct, the
Government may effectively preclude other cultures from being
granted similar rights based on the justification that the Government
does not owe similar restitution. In essence, giving the Rastafarian
Church in McBride equal treatment with other religions, while considering the Native Americans as the exception, furthers the court's attempts to prohibit drug use for religious purposes by separating the
two groups of religions-those of Native Americans and those of nonNative American cultures. This may conform with RFRA by construing rules related to drug use by the Native American Church as a
unique exception but may be inconsistent with the decision by the
Roberts Court in Uniao.
Under the Protection and Preservation of Traditional Religions of
Native Americans Act,54 the Government permits Native American
use of peyote, mitigating the acquiescence by stating that peyote has
existed for centuries and that its use has been permitted since 1965.11
Although a court would be unable to argue that solely because peyote
has been used since 1965 it has a history and tradition of use, a court
may be, nevertheless, justified in arguing the legitimacy of a Native
American sacramental intoxicant used as a traditional cultural act indigenous to the United States. The Government may then be justified
in permitting the use of ayahuasca by members of the UDV by noting
that the UDV is a religion native to the Americas and is, thus, similarly situated under the statute. However, by doing so, the Government would then essentially be maintaining special faith-based
privileges for religions that originated in the Americas, while denying
similar exceptions to those religious groups that originated on other
continents. In addition, the United States has traditionally granted
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1102.
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
McBride, 71 F. Supp.2d at 1102.
42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2006).
Id.
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unique benefits to Native Americans,56 which have not been extended
to other groups, particularly the UDV.
The definition of "Indian Religion" may be one way in which the
Government may rationalize a similarity between the UDV and the
Native American Church while drawing it further from the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church. Under the statute, the term "Indian Religion"
means any religion "which is practiced by Indians, and the origin and
interpretations of which is a form within a traditional Indian culture or
community."57 The statutory definition of "Indian" does not clearly
state whether all Native Americans are also Indians.58 The "origin
and interpretation" of the UDV faith comes from a pre-Columbian
belief indigenous to the Americas.59 Like many other religious groups
whose practices have been assimilated by Christian beliefs,60 the UDV
has its origins in a traditional Indian culture and community.61
The flaw in this argument is that it would permit converts of the
religion to be granted the same rights as those with blood lines to the
culture. Where the Native American Church is made up entirely of
those born into the faith, the majority of members of the North American UDV Churches are converts 62 By permitting sacramental use of
ayahuasca bynon-native converts to the faith, the Government may be
opening the floodgates for non-Native Americans to acquire and use
peyote by asserting that they are indeed members of the faith. Since
religious belief is subjective to an individual's lifestyle, the Government would have the burden of proving the legitimacy of one's adherence to his or her faith. Yet the statute explicitly states that only those
who are recognized as Indians may apply, which potentially raises
equal protection concerns.63
III.

THE ADHERENTS OF FAITH TEST

There are numerous cultural distinctions between the religions in
question, particularly regarding the beliefs to which they adhere while
consuming their respective intoxicants. Aside from the actual effect
of the drug used, the ritual use of the plants psychotria viridis and
56. See Indian Employment Credit Act, 26 U.S.C. § 45A (2006).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1996A(c)(3) (2006).
58. Id. § 1996A(c)(1-2) (defining "Indian" as "a member of an Indian Tribe").
59. Council on Spiritual Practices, Uniao do Vegetal, http://www.csp.org/nicholas/A18.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
60. See generally RICHARD FLETCHER, THE BARBARIAN CONVERSIONS: FROM PAGANISM

(1998).
61. See Council on Spiritual Practices, supra note 59.
62. See generally Charles S. Grob et al., Human Psychopharmacologyof Hoasca, a Plant
Hallucinogen Used in Ritual Context in Brazil, 184 J. OF NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE, Feb.
1996, at 87.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

TO CHRISTIANITY
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banisteripsiscaapi bears a strong resemblance to the taking of Communion in the Catholic Church; where one component is the intoxicant, the other serves as another important constituent of enacting the
ritual.6 4 The legality of the substance has no bearing on the ritualistic
and spiritual factors involved in receiving a religious communion.
Consider the Constitutional prohibition of alcohol in the early part of
the 20th century;6 5 enacting laws which made alcohol illegal did not
alter the necessary and sacred purpose of obeying the word of one's
god. Forcing an individual to forsake his or her own beliefs based
upon the prohibitions of the Government would effectively violate the
separation of Church and State. If the Church must adhere to the
command of the State, then the Church is no longer a house of faith
but an inhibited institution restricted by the command of an omnipotent secular authority. This cannot be the case, as the State would
never conversely permit the Church to undermine the actions and decisions of a government. Where a government is the exertion of influence in a state, religion is the exertion of influence in a church. A
church must be free to decide upon the rules and declarations of a
religious faith, just as a state must be free to determine what is necessary for the advancement of a government.
Under this analysis, no religion would be forced to adhere to the
laws of a state, and a state would not be forced to adhere to religious
doctrine. Arguably, a state could permit the smaller, less powerful
religion to co-exist as an independent authority yet remain subsumed
by political governance, much like tribal land within the United States
or consulates within foreign nations. Unfortunately, doing so would
also present problems in both the enforcement of laws intended to
protect the citizenry, as well as establishing the legitimacy of a religion. In order to allow a church to exist without the pressures of a state
but still enjoy the comfort and security it provides, a state would have
to accept a modified policing regime, enforcing laws which protect the
individual from outside harms but still permitting that individual to
make independent decisions for him or herself. Thus, one would not
be allowed to commit a crime against another, but the compelling interest related to protecting the health and safety of the individual
would be null and, therefore, leave actions, such as consumption of
intoxicating substances, to the discretion of that individual. Hence,
the individual would be given a choice as to whether to partake in the
use of a sacramental drug without fear of repercussion by the State.
The State could still promote anti-drug endeavors in the public setting, as well as restrict the Church from advertising its use of sacra64. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2009

CONST.

amend. XXI.

9

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2009], Art. 4

186

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:177

mental intoxicants, much like restrictions upon federal funding for
advertisement of abortion clinics. 6 6

A question may arise as to how this would affect the children of
such organizations' members. Traditionally, the Government does not
recognize the interests of the individual child as being separate from
the interests of the parent.67 This system may itself be flawed in that it
may neglect adequate protection for the welfare of the child; however,
the Court has maintained that a parent should be permitted to raise
his or her child in whatever manner the individual sees fit. 6 8 The
UDV places a strong emphasis on the importance of family unity, and,
like adherents of many other religions, the UDV believe it necessary
69
to instill the tenets of the family's faith in the child at a young age.
Consider the Bar Mitzvah in the Jewish faith. In accordance with cultural and religious beliefs, the child becomes an adult at the age of
thirteen, far younger than the age in which modern American society
passes such title.70 Thus, regardless of the legal standing of the adolescent by the Government, sincere devotees of various religions consider their children to be adults at differing ages. Hence, a child
would be permitted the same freedom as an adult to participate in the
activities of a smaller independent religious society if such a right is
consistent with the religion's canon, even if not necessarily in concurrence with the secular standard.
A second problem may exist in determining the legitimacy of a
given religion-which religions are able to obtain exclusive church
rights, and how large, individually and overall, may the Church be?
By enabling the Church to grow too large, the State would be forfeiting its own power to the Church and increasing the risk of adherents
to these faiths forsaking their loyalties to the State in favor of their
religion. If the State were to attempt to limit the size and authority of
the Church, the State would effectively violate the Establishment
Clause. 7 ' The State would need to create a system in order to determine the legitimacy of the Church. This could be achieved by considering: (A) the history and tradition of the Church; (B) the degree of
commonality of faith and practice by its adherents; and (C) the burden in which permitting its practices would usurp the authority of the
State.
66. See generally Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
67. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
69. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 62.
70. See Leonard Mars, Coming of Age Among Jews: Bar Mitzvah and Bat Mitzvah Ceremonies, in ANTHROPOLOGY & THE RIDDLE OF THE SPHINX: PARADOXES OF CHANGE IN THE LIFE
COURSE 64 (Paul Spencer ed., 1990).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Under the first prong, a court would question the history and tradition of a given church. The UDV was founded in 1961;72 however,
adherents to the faith may also argue that the cultural practice of ayahuasca consumption has been occurring since pre-Columbian times,
long before the establishment of the United States and its laws.73 The
same argument could follow from the Native American Church, as the
Government has asserted that traditional Indian practices must be
kept intact.74 The Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church was developed in
1914 by Marcus Garvey and later became the inspiration for the practice of Rastafarianism. 75 According to the Rastafarians, the Jamaican
Negroes originated in Ethiopia, their symbolic leader being the Emperor Haile Selassie 1.76 An issue would arise as to how long a religion must exist before it is considered to have a "history." Currently
there are between 3,000 to 5,000 Rastafarians in the United States and
almost one million adherents worldwide. 77 Based on these numbers,
the burden would be on the State to prove that such a faith lacks a
tradition. Additionally, the Court in Olsen accepted that, for purposes
of its decision, the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church was a bona fide
religion.78
It may be argued that defending the freedom of older religions,
while denying such rights to relatively younger religions, would effectively violate the Equal Protection Clause. 79 Therefore, it would be
necessary for a court to decide not only how heavily to weigh this
factor, but also whether a religion has a valid argument that its belief
structure can be categorized as a new religious sect rather than a frivolous cult. The fear of permitting more recently established religions
the same autonomy as more established faiths is that there may be no
evidence that the more recent religion would thrive or that it actually
72. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 50.
73. Choque Chinchay, AYAHUASCA: An Overview of an ExtraordinaryHealing Plant and
its Companions, http://www.biopark.org/ayahuasca.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
74. See T.J. Ferguson, Native Americans and the Practice of Archaeology, 25 ANN. REv. OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 63, 63-79 (1996); DAVID HURST THOMAS, SKULL WARS: KENNEWICK MAN,
ARCHAEOLOGY, AND THE BATTLE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN IDENTI
rY 214-15 (2000). There may
be reason to believe that the United States preserves the Native American way of life and grants
them additional unique freedoms in order to sustain as sort of a living museum of the prehistoric
existence of Tribes in the Americas. Consider that in the United States, if an archaeological
study is conducted in which human bones are excavated from the site, the Tribes are given the
opportunity to inspect the site and even close it down if they believe the site belonged to their
ancestors. After which they are permitted to appropriate the site. This creates much frustration
for the American archaeological community.
75. J. GORDON MELTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 1413 (Gale Group, 5th
ed. 1996) (1978).
76. Id. at 1754.
77. Id.
78. Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
79. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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has an assembly of members who adhere to an identical set of beliefs.
By having a "religious tenure," the Government would be able to test
the organization to see if it could maintain a strong member foundation before granting it such freedoms. Thus, a bona fide church
should be capable of surviving long enough to establish that its members deserve such equivalent rights.
The second prong may prove to be a strong factor in resolving the
discrepancies between the religious organizations which are currently
permitted sacramental intoxicant use and those which are denied such
rights. The UDV maintains a hierarchical ranking system for members and leaders of the Church. 0 In addition, members are required
to learn Portuguese, as the language is used during ceremonial services, similar to the way Latin was used in the Catholic Church and
Hebrew is used in a Jewish Synagogue.8 1 UDV members make sacramental use of ayahuasca on certain days and times, as well as during
celebration for enumerated calendar holidays.82 This differs from the
lack of uniformity and structure in the Rastafarian Church.8 3 The
court in McBride noted that, although members proscribed to the
same faith, the practices of the faith itself were only a loose network
of postulates, actions being up to the discretion of the individual.8 4
Additionally, there is no specific day or time in which the sacramental
drug was used. In State v. Olsen,86 the petitioner argued that "ganja"
was used "continually all day, . . . through everything that we do."8 7
In view of this argument, a court must presume either that everything
the religion does all day is sacramental or that the drug use is not in
fact sacred to the faith. If the court determines the latter, then it follows that the faith is not in fact a religion for purposes of this test.
Although it may be argued again that favoring formalized churches
over unstructured, informal churches would pose Equal Protection
problems, a court would be able to address these concerns by taking
into consideration whether the informal organizations maintain a cohesive enough ideological structure to regard the groups as churches.
The Government would likely want to avoid granting freedoms to unorganized religions for fear that some individuals would join the faith
solely for the purpose of obtaining illegal substances rather than out
of a sincere desire to practice religious dogma. Thus, in requiring a
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 50.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 58-60.
McBride v. Shawnee County, 71 F. Supp.2d 1098, 1101 (D. Kan. 1999).
Id.
Id.
315 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1982).
Id. at 7.
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formal structure, the Church would be able to regulate its own members by requiring them to participate in all religious activities and not
leave it up to the individual to "cherry-pick."
Lastly, the burden must be upon the State to prove that permitting
the organization's adherents to participate in religious activities, such
as sacramental drug use, would hinder the State in exerting its authority. This is where the currently standing compelling interest would be
analyzed-if prohibiting the organization to act as an independent
church contributes to the furtherance of a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
88
governmental interest, the Government will have met its burden.
The result of this analysis favors the Government and would effectively eliminate the religious organization; however, if the previous
two prongs have been satisfied, the Government would need a significant compelling reason to show that the religion poses a substantial
burden on a governmental interest. In essence, the third factor would
be used to supplement a court's decision made in light of the first two
prongs.
Peyote and ayahuasca are relatively uncommon drugs, and persons
who use these substances in religious rituals, although extensive in
numbers, are uncommon in relation to the rest of the United States
population.8 9 Marijuana use, on the other hand, is very common, but
the Government has no more standing to prohibit marijuana use by
religious adherents solely based on the fact that it is more common
than it has to prohibit the generally low incidences of peyote and ayahuasca use. In other words, all three drugs are illegal and all fall
within the same category of Schedule I substances, and if two are permitted use by their religious group, it follows that the third should be
as well. The Government would likely attempt to argue that permitting the use by the religious group would encourage more people to
become false adherents; however, such an argument would be tenuous
as it is difficult to prove what a person does and does not believe.
Essentially, as the current compelling governmental interest test has
proven vague, it must be supplemented by a more practical and consistent test. Governmental interests are constantly changing, depending on the politics and the necessities of the nation. However,
permitting a religion to act free of the Government's decisions would
be the most practical method of establishing a freedom of religion, as
well as separating Church and State. The only requirement by the
Government would be for the organization to prove that it is in fact a
true religion and that its tenets are strictly observed.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a) (1993).
89. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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BELIEFS, ACTIONS, AND CIVIL RELIGION

In Cantwell v. Connecticut,9" the Court differentiated between the
two freedoms that derive from the establishment clause-a freedom
to believe and a freedom to act. 9 The Court considered the first absolute in nature, whereas the second was not.92 The Court justified
this by stating that "[c]onduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society."93 In Reynolds v. United States,94 the Supreme
Court upheld a criminal statute proscribing polygamy, despite the fact
that polygamy was a basic tenet of the defendant's Mormon religion. 95
However, unlike the cases above, the religious belief in Reynolds was
not achieved through polygamy; instead, polygamy followed the tenets of the religious belief. 96 Based upon the holding in Cantwell, it
may be possible for a religion to be denied its right to a particular
belief by not being permitted their right to act, as beliefs often follow
from acts. If the purpose of using the drug is to put the believer in a
certain mental state, one which he or she would not be able to achieve
but for the drug's use, then the only way that user will be able to
obtain his or her desired spiritual nirvana is through committing those
actions, which are themselves subject to this kind of regulation.
In Mirsky's Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause,97 the au-

thor argues that the separation between Church and State is actually
less concrete than we think, as the formation of a "civil religion" has
transpired in the formation of our national heroes, like Washington
and Lincoln, and holy days, like the Fourth of July and Memorial
Day.98 The permissiveness and denial of drug use by our civil religion
has thus trumped the laws of the less powerful non Judeo-Christian
faiths. Consider "under God" in the pledge, as well as "in God we
trust."99 These slogans are controversial in that they fit with the
whole societal schema under which the United States developed, so
society may be reluctant to remove such simple prayers from their
everyday lives. 100 But enforcing acts, not beliefs, like referring to
"God" in a pledge, and not allowing the use of illegal drugs, essentially concedes that the civil secular faith is to be taken seriously,
whereas the small minority faith is not. It has been said that "one
90. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).

91. Id. at 303.
92. Id. at 304.
93. Id. See also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
94. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

95. Id. at 166-67.
96. See id. at 166.
97. Yehudah Mirsky, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986).

98. Id. at 1251.
99. See id. at 1238.
100. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another," ' ' yet this may not be true if the majority civil religion has
formulated the laws by which the minority faiths are governed.
Historically, the people of the United States have considered religious beliefs, in many instances, to be more important than obeying
laws enacted by the government, one instance being the creation of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Throughout
history, adherents of various faiths have suffered persecution; some
have preferred a death in accordance with divine command to a life of
sin. 102 Although it seems that much of modern society lives under the
practicality of science, rather than the judgment of a god, it would still
be difficult for anyone, including a government, to convince a sincere
religious adherent that his genuine religious beliefs are false, even in
the face of public adversity. The United States is home to many devout religious organizations which, by society's standards, may seem a
bit extreme and unreasonable but are still permitted to believe and act
as they choose without reprimand by the Government. 10 3 Unfortunately, while some of these religious organizations are favored by the
Government because their belief structure is aligned with the political
standing of a dominant political party, other religious organizations
suffer as political and social xenophobia makes their practices unaccepted by society.
In addition, people are often born into their faiths and are not given
an opportunity to truly question their belief structure until they are
old enough to see the world through more scrupulous eyes.10 4 There
exists a minority of Americans who disagree with the tenets of the
civil religion,' 015 and many break these tenets through illegal acts such
as underage drinking, drunk driving, jay-walking, and tax fraud. Although these acts are certainly not condonable, they serve as indication that even the tenets of the majority civil faith are not fully
believed nor adhered to by the people and thus have no more right to
be accepted than the belief-based actions of the minority religions.
101. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
102. See JACOB RADER MARCUS, THE JEW IN THE MEDIEVAL WORLD: A SOURCE BOOK
315-1791 (1999).
103. See Craig M. Kibler, Assembly Declines to Make Clerk More Accountable, THE LAYMAN: A PUBLICATION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN LAY COMMrrrEE, July 2003 at 9, available at http://
www.layman.org/TheLayman.aspx (referring to the Uniao do Vegetal as spirit, plant, and animal
worshipers who encourage ritualistic vomiting).
104. RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: A JOURNEY THROUGH AFRICA, NORTH
AMERICA, MESOAMERICA, JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, HINDUISM, BUDDHISM, CHINA, AND
JAPAN 385-86, 445-46, 682-83 (H. Byron Earharted., 1993) (explaining the "born into" nature of

Judaism and, to a lesser extent, the rites of passage of Islam).
105. See DAVID DELEON, THE AMERICAN AS ANARCHIST:
RADICALISM

REFLECTIONS ON INDIGENOUS

16-23, 47, 117 (1978).
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Yet one could always argue before the courts or petition legislatures
to change laws. Law, like religion, is ever changing to accommodate
what is accepted and desired by society. 1 6 Perhaps the Government's
strongest argument in this situation is to say that its beliefs are based
on the safe and prolonged livelihood of its people. Perhaps the Establishment Clause was submitted by the founding fathers to prevent war
and strife over religion within the nation's bounds. Drug use, drunk
driving, and jay-walking, although not necessarily analogous to war
and strife, are similarly dangerous to peoples' livelihoods and, as a
result, are not permissible.
"[O]ne man's 'bizarre cult' is another's true path to salvation."1 °7
The Judeo-Christian faiths have stories of when their own religion was
once considered a cult, wrong, and illegal. 108 History speaks of times
when people were killed for their individual beliefs in god. Prior to
Constantine, the Christians were fed to the lions. Mennonites were
pushed out of Europe for simple cultural differences in faiths. 0 9
Many came to the United States for freedom from religious persecution. Perhaps we are no longer seeking more workers to build our
towns and harvest our crops, and thus have become less warm and
welcoming to anyone or anything that does not fit within our social
comfort zone.
V.

RELIGIOUS GERRYMANDERING

"Beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent[,] or comprehensible to other[s] in order to merit First Amendment Protection."' 10
The Court's goal is to look objectively into the merits of a case and be
able to provide impartial justice for all individuals, regardless of
whether that individual's activities fall outside of what a society considers normal,"' but it is society that deems certain drugs impermissible, regardless of the extent to which that drug poses a danger to
society and to what degree it is more or less injurious than legal
drugs. ' 2 What our society regards as damaging is reflected in the
106. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 73-74.
107. Harvey Cox, Playing the Devil's Advocate, As it Were, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1977, at
A25.
108. See RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note 105, at 495-502 (describing the
origins of early Christianity, its various sects, its ties to Judaism, and Roman laws regulating and
persecuting Christianity). See also NINIAN SMART, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 246-47 (2d ed.
1998) (describing early Christianity as a "mystery cult" and mentioning the Roman persecution
of both Christians and Jews).
109. See HAROLD S. BENDER & C. HENRY SMITH, MENNONITES AND THEIR HERITAGE (4th
ed. 1973).
110. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
111. Id.
112. See Robert S. Gable, Comparison of Acute Lethal Toxicity of Commonly Abused
Psychoactive Substances, 99 ADDICTION 686 (2004) (discussing a study testing the relative levels
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laws, yet the same society permits the use of alcohol and tobacco but
not peyote, mescaline, or marijuana.
A society's standards have been ruled by the Courts to be an unworkable justification for the prevention of a religious activity. In
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,'1 3 a Santeria group
was prohibited by a Florida animal cruelty statute from performing
animal sacrifices.11 4 The Government argued that the statute punishes "[w]hoever . . . unnecessarily . . . kills any animal," and that
killings for religious reasons are always unnecessary.11 5 The Court determined that the Government's interests were not compelling; that
"the Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance[;]" 6 and that it is the duty of Congress to remember the duties and rights granted by the Constitution.
If this sort of religious gerrymandering prohibits a government from
excluding one religious group based on its unusual activities, would it
not necessarily be gerrymandering if it were to exclude a religious
group from using a controlled substance solely because the controlled
substance also has a widespread recreational use? Suppose that the
Florida statute was enacted to prevent people from deliberately harming house pets and having cock fights. Similar anti-drug laws are enacted to prevent recreational use of drugs. If the Court is able to
strike down a statute that was passed specifically to target the unusual
activities of one religion, like sacrificing animals for religious purposes, it should follow that certain laws may be struck down if they
deny the use of controlled substances for religious purposes. The
Court has already created such exceptions for the two drugs that have
less pervasive recreational use, but it has rejected similar requests for
the more prevalent religious marijuana use. 1 7
When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the animal cruelty statutes, "stated that in prerevolution Cuba 'people were put in jail for
practicing this religion,' the audience [at a Hialeah City Council meeting] applauded."" 8 Does this imply that we too should seek a nation
where certain religious groups are seen as outsiders, and their actions
of toxicity of psychoactive substances and finding marijuana and DMT relatively non-lethal,
mescaline rarely lethal, alcohol commonly lethal and the most common co-intoxicant in cause of
death). See also HAROLD KALANT et al., THE HEALTH EFFECTs OF CANNABIS 437 (1999); J.C.
Callaway et al., Pharmacokinetics of Hoasca Alkaloids in Healthy Humans, 65 J. OF
ETHNOPHARMACOLOGY 243 (1999).
113. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
114. Id. at 527-28.
115. Id. at 526 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 828.12 (1987)).
116. Id. at 547.
117. See Gonzalez v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006);
Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
118. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 541.
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are looked upon with a sense of racial intolerance? In Nazi Germany,
the Government solicited advertisements depicting Jews as monsters
and vampires, so when they were removed from the cities, the
Germans too would applaud." 9 The Court rejected the Councilman's
indications of the desires of the masses because it suggested a suppression of minority religion 2 ' Adhering to the masses' unknowledgeable
rejection of sacramental drug use may also suppress religions like the
Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church; so it is arguable that the Court should
consider the same dilemma when refusing to allow the religion to act
upon the tenets of its faith.
The ordinances permitted such killing as fishing, extermination of
rats and mice, and euthanasia of stray, neglected, abandoned or unwanted animals."' 1 The determinative factors for which animals may
and may not be killed according to the city seemed arbitrary, but the
City explicitly carved out specific factors for which it would permit
euthanizing. The statute stated that an animal may be killed "for humanitarian reasons or [when the animal] is of no commercial
value[,] ''1 2 2 or when the infliction of pain or suffering is "in the interest of medical science. '1 23 Had the ordinance been passed, the Court
would have effectively been saying that commercial purposes and
medical science outweigh the interests in pursuit of religion.
This degree of lack of trust and understanding about the practices
of another religion is exactly the type of mindset the Court has attempted to remove from law. A control should be placed over the
Government from inhibiting religious practice solely because a practice does not fit within the confines of what society dictates is normal.
Where a group of people are permitted to have their own ethnocentric
beliefs as to what is and is not fitting and correct, those personal beliefs of the individual and the masses should never be allowed to
breach another individual's conviction in the value of his or her
religion.
VI.

THE

LESSER OF

EvILs

The district court noted in Uniao that courts must balance the actual
irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the potential harm to the Gov119. See

RANDALL

L.

BYTWERK, BENDING SPINEs: THE PROPAGANDAS

AND THE GERMAN DEMoCRATIc REPUBLIC

OF NAZI GERMANY

(2004).

120. Lukumi, 508 U.S at 542.
121. Id. at 543.
122. FLA. STAT. § 828.073(4)(c)(2) (2009).
123. FLA. STAT. § 828.02 (2009).
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ernment. 1 24 Thus, the actual practical difference between Uniao and
Olsen cases was the risk associated with diversion. In Uniao, the
plaintiff took careful steps to avoid the drug getting into the wrong
hands. 125 The UDV set up strict rules as to who was allowed to use
the ayahuasca and when it could be consumed.12 6 Members who violated these rules were subject to expulsion from the organization. 2 7
The UDV also indicated to the Court that they maintained strict policies against other narcotics use.1 28 The plaintiff claimed that he only
imported quantities
of the plant necessary to perfom the church
29
ceremonies.1
The plaintiff in State v. Olsen, on the other hand, was caught with
large quantities of marijuana prepared for distribution.130 The court is
likely aware of the relative ease of obtaining marijuana in the United
States as opposed to less common drugs such as peyote and ayahuasca. Perhaps the court was also aware that, due to the pervasive
use of marijuana, members of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church were
likely going to acquire marijuana regardless of their court's decision.
This creates a problem because it makes preventing marijuana misuse
practically unenforceable. Prohibiting a religion from obtaining its
sacramental drug, while recognizing that members will continue to do
so anyways, essentially encourages the performance of illegal activity.
Courts must realize that the law will only be as constructive as it is
obeyed.
Additionally, it may be argued that the more dangerous a drug is,
the more it should be restricted. Studies have shown that marijuana
use is considerably less dangerous than DMT,' 3 yet DMT is permitted limited use among a certain individuals.' 3 2 Marijuana, although a
Schedule I drug, has in fact had a history of accepted medical use in
the United States.' 3 3 Further, if the Court permitted regulated marijuana use in the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, perhaps it would decrease the likelihood that the Church members would engage in illegal
acts and increase the likelihood that they would limit their use of ma124. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429
(2006) (citing 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 1009
(10th Cir. 2004) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
125. See Joint Appendix (Vol. 1), supra note 14, at 69.

126. Id. at 63.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 64
Id. at 63.
Id. at 66.
State v. Olsen, 315
See supra note 113
Uniao, 546 U.S. at
Gonzales v. Raich,

N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1982).
and accompanying text.
423.
545 U.S. 1, 11 (2005).
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rijuana to sacramental activities. 134 Rather, the Court rejects such requests, yet permits the use of peyote, whose users spend an average of
eight hours incapacitated. 3 5 If the Court were to base its determination of which religions are permitted to use the illegal drug and which
are not on the relative dangerousness of the drug, they would be hard
pressed to justify the use of either peyote or ayahuasca.
CONCLUSION

If the Court were required to take an all or nothing approach in
permitting religious drug use rather than continue to employ its current method of finely detailing which organizations may obtain such
an exclusion, it would be forced to extend equal rights to all organizations which request individual religious benefits. Otherwise, the Government would be capable of discerning a legitimate compelling
reason to eliminate such freedom from all religions.
Considering the implausibility of such a carte blanche approach, it
would be beneficial for the Government to establish a more precise
test by which all petitioning religions could be judged. First, the Court
should look into the history and tradition of the religion to determine
its legitimacy as a sincere and comprehensive faith. Second, the Court
should explore the commonalities between adherents of the faith and
question the degree to which its members adhere to similar tenets.
Lastly, the Court should balance the burden that permitting such freedoms would have on the State and decide whether granting those freedoms serve a more just function than those of the specific goals of the
Government. If the Court does not adopt a standard method of
weighing the freedoms of religious organizations adequately, it will be
forced to continue using an ad hoc inquiry to designate these
freedoms.
The Court in Uniao understood that the freedom of religious practice is essential to furthering the goals set by the Constitution. By
encumbering the freedom for religious groups to act in accordance
with their faith, the Court would effectively be stripping a part of that
freedom from its citizens. If the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church were
to come before the Supreme Court and argue the merits of their case,
the Court would be hard pressed after Uniao to expound a justification for denying a similar legal exemption. However, the likelihood of
134. The Court appointed amicus curiae proposed a limited "restrictive religious exemption"
for the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church. Church members over the age of majority would be
permitted to use marijuana during their Saturday evening prayer and would not be allowed to
leave the place where the ceremony was conducted until eight hours had passed. The DEA
denied this exemption. Olsen v. DEA, 878 F.2d 1458, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
135. John H. Halpern et al., Psychologicaland Cognitive Effects of Long-Term Peyote Use
among Native Americans, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 624 (2005).
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such a case coming before the Supreme Court is slim. Perhaps other
motives have pressed the Court to hear Uniao and extend the UDV
such a controversial freedom, yet the prospect of legalizing marijuana
use is certainly a fire with which the Court does not want to play.
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